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NOTES
Loss of Consortium: Kentucky
Should No Longer Prohibit a
Child's Claim for Loss of Parental
Consortium Due to the Negligent
Act of a Third Party
INTRODUCTION
A child in Kentucky has no claim for loss of parental consortium'
when a parent is injured due to another person's negligence. Kentucky's
Supreme Court most recently addressed this issue in 1977, when it
declined to allow such a claim on the grounds that no other jurisdiction
had yet recognized such a cause of action.2 This remained the case until
1980, but now a trend is rapidly emerging in other jurisdictions toward
recognizing a child's claim for loss of parental consortium due to a third
party's negligence.
' Generally, loss of consortium "consists of several elements, encompassing not only
material services but such intangibles as society, guidance, companionship, and sexual
relation." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 309 (6th ed. 1990).
' Brooks v. Burkeen, 549 S.W.2d 91, 92 (Ky. 1977) ("[N]o court or legislature in
the United States has yet seen fit to recognize such an action. We decline the opportunity
to be the first to do so.").
See, e.g., Hibshipman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska
1987) (recognizing that minors do have a separate cause of action for loss of parental
consortium); Villareal v. State Dep'tofTransp., 774 P.2d 213, 216 (Ariz. 1989) (holding
that children may recover for loss of consortium when a parent has a serious, permanent,
and disabling injury); Audubon-Exira v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148, 151-52
(Iowa 1983) (citing an Iowa statute that allows children to bring an action for loss of
parental consortium in cases of parental death or injury); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's
Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Mass. 1980) (holding that children have the right to a
remedy when they lose their expectation of parental society due to the negligent acts of
others); Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Mich. 1981) (holding that children are
entitled to damages for loss of parental society and companionship); Pence v. Fox, 813
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Claims for loss of consortium are currently recognized in Kentucky
for the loss of a child4 and for the loss of a spouse.' Such claims have
been gaining acceptance based on the common law recognition of the
importance of certain relationships beyond mere economic ties." Although
a child can recover under Kentucky's wrongful death statute,7 he or she
is left without recourse when a parent is seriously injured and cannot
carry on a relationship with the child equivalent to their pre-injury
relationship. Due to the development in Kentucky of consortium claims
in general,' the trend in other jurisdictions toward recognition of claims
for loss of parental consortium, 9 and vital policy reasons,"0 it is time for
P.2d 429, 433 (Mont. 1991) (recognizing a separate cause of action for children for loss
of parental consortium); Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840, 842 (N.M. 1994) (permitting
children to recover damages for loss of consortium); Gallimore v. Children's Hospital
Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1060 (Ohio 1993) (adopting a cause of action for loss of
parental consortium where a parent is negligently or intentionally injured by a third
party); Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1138 (Okla. 1990) (recognizing the existence
of a child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804
S.W.2d 463, 464 (rex. 1990) (holding that a child can recover damages for loss of
parental consortium due to injury or death), overruled inpart, 34 Tex. Sup. J. 419 (1991);
Ueland v. Reynolds Metal Co., 691 P.2d 190, 195 (Wash. 1984) (recognizing a separate
cause of action for minors for loss of consortium from parents); Belcher v. Goins, 400
S.E.2d 830, 841 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that any minor or handicapped child may
maintain an action for loss of parental consortium); Thearna v. Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513,
522 (Wis. 1984) (recognizing that a child has a cause of action for loss of parental society
and companionship); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Wyo.
1990) (holding that minors have an independent claim for loss of parental consortium);
see also Annotation, Child's Right of Action for Loss of Support, Training, Parental
Attention, or the Like, Against a Third Person Negligently Injuring Parent, 11 A.L.R.4th
549 (1982) (discussing state and federal cases that have considered whether children may
recover for loss of parental consortium).
4 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.135 (Baldwin 1994). This statute allows parents to
recover damages for the loss of "affection and companionship" based on the wrongful
death of a minor child, but not for serious injury to a minor child. Id.
5 Id. § 411.145. This statute defines consortium as "the right to services, assistance,
aid, society, companionship and conjugal relationship between husband and wife, or wife
and husband." Id.
" Michael A. Mogill, And Justice for Some: Assessing the Need to Recognize the
Child's Action for Loss of Parental Consortium, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1321, 1328 (1992)
(discussing the fact that courts are recognizing the importance of 'love, society,
companionship and affection" instead of "services" as the predominant elements in
consortium claims). Id.
7Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.130 (Baldwin 1994) (allowing the family to recover
damages when a family member is negligently or intentionally killed).
See infra notes 38-68 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 138-89 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra notes 190-208 and accompanying text.
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Kentucky's Supreme Court to grant validity to a child's claim for loss of
parental consortium.
Part I of this Note will discuss the history of consortium claims in
general." Part H will look at the particular history of consortium claims
in Kentucky.12 Part Il outlines the major arguments against recognizing
this new cause of action,13 while Part IV refutes these reasons in favor of
recognition. 4 Part V points out some of the policy considerations which
support such a claim,'5 and finally, this Note concludes that Kentucky
should recognize a child's right to sue for loss of parental consortium
when a parent is injured by another's negligence. 6
I HISTORY OF CONSORTIuM CLAIMS
The Roman system of "paterfamilias" is the root of protection for
relational interests among family members. 7 The idea, which made its
way through England to American common law, was that an injury to the
wife, children, or servants of the father of the family was also an injury
to the father. 8 In other words, they had identical interests. 9 A husband
or father's right to sue for injury to his wife, children, or servants was
based upon his loss of their services.2 Notably, this right to sue was only
allowed to the husband, for when the wife sustained a loss it was "only
the loss of the comfort of her husband's society and affectionate attention,
which the law cannot estimate or remedy."2'
Modem courts and statutes no longer emphasize the notion of
"services" when addressing a consortium claim. Factors such as love,
society, affection, and companionship play a much greater role in their
determinations.' Even though recognition of more than just an interest
"See infra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 38-68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 69-137 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 138-89 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 190-208 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
1' Susan G. Ridgeway, Loss of Consortium and Loss of Services Actions: A Legacy
of Separate Spheres, 50 MONT. L. REV. 349, 352 (1989).
"Id.
"Id. This idea passed to the English common law through a master-servant analogy.
Id. at 353.
20Id.
21 Mogill, supra note 6, at 1328 (quoting Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863
UIr. 1861)).
= Id.
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in "services" began before the nineteenth century, a wife's identity was
considered to merge into the husband's at marriage, and she had no claim
for loss of his consortium.'s With the enactment of the Married Women's
Acts ("Acts") in the late nineteenth century, the concept of the merged
identity was finally abolished2 After passage of the Acts a married
woman maintained a "separate legal identity, and an interest in her own
property, as well as... the right to contract." However, even with this
enlightened view of a wife's rights, she was still only allowed to sue for
intentional injuries to her husband, and not for loss of consortium due to
negligence." Intentional acts were considered to cause "a malicious
interference with the marriage," and malice was thought necessary for
such a claim to be valid.27
The first major breakthrough for wives was in 1950 with Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co.28 With this decision, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals became the first court in the nation to recognize a wife's cause
of action for loss of her husband's consortium z Interestingly, in finding
this cause of action, the court refuted many of the arguments that courts
continue to use today against allowing a child to recover for loss of
parental consortium." The crucial factor in the court's decision was that
there was really no basis for allowing a husband to bring a consortium
claim and not allowing a wife to bring a reciprocal action." Currently all
23 Id. at 1329.
z Id.2
5Id.
2 Id. at 1330.
2' Id. Mogill also cites a relevant Kentucky case, Turner v. Heavrin, 206 S.W. 23,
25 (Ky. 1918), which endorses the philosophy behind the Acts:
[Tihe tendency of [the Married Women's Acts] ... [has] been to put the
husband and wife upon an exact equality before the law, whereby the common-
law rule of servitude in marriage had been repealed, so that the husband and
wife now stand upon an equality of right in respect to property, torts, and
contracts. . . . [There is] no reason in natural justice why the right of the wife
to maintain an action against the seductress of her husband should not be
coextensive with his right of action against her seducer.
Id.
" 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
Id. at 812. The court noted the fact that they were not "unaware of the unanimity
of authority elsewhere denying the wife recovery under these circumstances.' Id.
10 Id. at 814-15.
3' Id. at 819. The court stated that:
It can hardly be said that a wife has less of an interest in the marriage relation
than does the husband or in these modem times that a husband renders services
of such a different character to the family and household that they must be
[Vol 84
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but three jurisdictions in the United States allow a similar claim to be
made.'
Although the common law did not consider a child to be the property
of his father, the father was still allowed to recover for loss of the child's
services when the child was negligently injured.3 However, as the idea
of the primacy of services in a consortium claim eroded, a number of
courts began to recognize that the parent's loss of a child's affection,
society, and companionship deserved compensation.' Kentucky is one
of many states that recognizes a parent's right to recovery in a wrongful
death claim for its minor child.35
Several states have gone so far as to recognize a parent's right to
recover even when her child is merely injured due to another's negli-
gence. The 1975 case of Shockley v. Prier36 involved the blinding of a
measured by a standard of such uncertainty that the law cannot estimate any
loss thereof. The husband owes the same degree of love, affection, felicity, etc.,
to the wife as she to him.
Id.
32 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-36 (Michie 1994) (abolishing a husband's right to
sue for loss of consortium); Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 647 P.2d 1263, 1266-67 (Kan.
1982) (holding that a wife has no separate cause of action for loss of consortium); Cozart
v. Chapin, 241 S.E.2d 144, 145-46 (N.C. 1978) (declining to recognize a husband's right
of action for loss of consortium due to the negligent acts of others); see also D. Richard
Joslyn, Annotation, Wife's Right of Action for Loss of Consortium, 36 A.L.R.3D 900
(1971) (discussing if and when a wife has a cause of action for the loss of her husband's
consortium).
31 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 125,
at 934 (5th ed. 1984).
Id. at 932.
3 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.135 (Baldwin 1994) (allowing parents of a minor
child to recover damages for loss of consortium in a wrongful death action); see also
ALA. CODE § 6-5-391 (1994); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-612 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 3724 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3
(1994); IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-8 (West 1994); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 633.336 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904 (1993); LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. art. 2315.2 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROc. § 3-904 (1994);
MICH. COMe. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West
1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-512 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 12.080 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
28A-18-2 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-03 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02
(Baldwin 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West 1994); OR. REV. STAT. §
30.020 (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. 78-11-6 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492 (1994);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (West
1994); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.04 (West 1995); WYo.
STAT. § 1-38-102 (1995).
225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
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child as a result of a physician's negligence. The court stated, "[olne
needs little imagination to see the shattering effect that ... [the child's]
blindness will have on the relationship between him and his parents. The
loss of enjoyment of those experiences normally shared by parents and
children need no enumeration here."37 Since there is a cause of action
for injury to the parent/child relationship when the child is injured, there
should also be a cause of action for the child when the parent is injured.
I. HISTORY OF CONSORTIUM CLAIMS IN KENTUCKY
Under current Kentucky law, only a husband or wife can make a
claim for loss of consortium due to the negligence of others outside of
the wrongful death context.38 "Consortium" is defined as "the right to
the services, assistance, aid, society, companionship and conjugal
relationship between husband and wife, or wife and husband."39 The
basis for this statute was the Kentucky Supreme Court's 1970 decision in
Kotsiris v. Ling.!'
Andrew Kotsiris made a claim for damages against George Ling for
injuries sustained by Kotsiris due to Ling's negligence."1 After his claim
was settled, his wife asserted a claim against Ling for loss of her
husband's consortium. 2 At the time, the majority of jurisdictions in the
United States still denied such a claim."3 However, the court felt that the
justifications for denial had been "worked carefully upon, beat soundly,
thwacked repeatedly, drubbed, and assailed verbally," " by scholars and
other courts. Therefore, the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected stare
decisis"5 and expressly overruled their earlier cases denying such a
claim."6 Thus, the court allowed Mrs. Kotisiris' claim for loss of society,
companionship, conjugal affections, and physical assistance to proceed."
In Kotsiris the court stated that it was persuaded by the reasoning in
Hitaffer, which addressed and dispensed with the major arguments against
37 Id. at 499.
31 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.145 (Baldwin 1994).
39 Id.
- 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970).
41 Id. at 411.
42Id.
43 Id.
4 Id. at 412.
41 Stare decisis is defined as the "[p]olicy of courts to stand by precedent and not to
disturb settled point." BLAcK'S LAw DIcnoNARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
Kotsiris, 451 S.W.2d at 412.
47 Id. at 413.
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recognizing a wife's cause of action for loss of consortium.! The
Hitaffer court dismissed the argument that a wife was not entitled to her
husband's services as an "arbitrary separation of the various elements of
consortium devised to circumvent the logic of allowing the wife such an
action."" Emphasis on services was misplaced, for consortium was to
be viewed as a "conceptualistic unity" of love, affection, companionship,
and sexual relations."0
The Kotsiris decision also dismissed the argument that there was a
danger of double recovery. This argument reasons that the wife should
not have a separate claim for damages arising out of the same incident for
which her physically injured husband already has his own claim for
damages.5 Once again the court stated that services were not to be the
only element considered in a consortium claim. 2 Additionally the court
recognized certain sentimental elements for which a wife has a right to
recovery. 3 It went on to dismiss the argument of indirectness (that the
wife was not directly harmed by the tortfeasor's actions) as moot in light
of the fact that this had never stopped a husband from being allowed to
recover for loss of a wife's consortium.' The Kotsiris court thus
rebuked some of the same arguments (double recovery and indirectness)
that have been used by opponents of a child's recovery for loss of
parental consortium. Although these reasons were not explicitly adopted
in Kotsiris, the Kentucky Supreme Court's endorsement of the Hitaffer
decision clearly shows approval of that court's rationales in refuting many
of these standard arguments.
As in many other jurisdictions, the children of Kentucky have not yet
had these arguments successfully applied in their favor. However, the
reciprocity argument used by the court in Hitaffer can also be used in
Kentucky when looking at the statute allowing parents to recover
damages for the wrongful death of their minor child.' This statute states
that in a wrongful death action for a child, a parent has the right to sue
for "loss of affection and companionship." Logically then a child
4' Id. at 412.
4 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
"Id. at 814.
s, Kotsirs, 451 S.W.2d at 412 (stating that a wife cannot recover the cost of services
provided to the injured husband; only the husband, as the injured party, can recover from
the tortfeasor).
5Id.
3Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814.
"Id. at 815.
55 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.135 (Baldwin 1994).
6Id.
1995-96]
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should also be able to sue for "loss of affection and companionship"
when he or she loses a parent's society.
This logical analysis has been successfully applied in at least two
jurisdictions. In Ueland v. Reynolds Metal Co., the Washington
Supreme Court faced a statutory situation similar to the present one in
Kentucky. In Washington a parent could recover loss of consortium
damages for the death or injury of a child by another's negligence."
Moreover, under the state's wrongful death statute, a child could recover
for loss of companionship if the parent died as a result of another's negli-
gence. 9 However, a child could recover nothing if the parent was
severely injured but remained alive in a vegetative state.6" The court
found this to be an incongruent state of affairs: "[P]ermitting a husband
or wife but not children to recover for loss of consortium erroneously
suggests that an adult is more likely to suffer emotional injury than a
child." 6
t
Similarly, in Weid v. Moes6' the Iowa Supreme Court was forced to
interpret a statute that recognized a parent's right to sue for loss of
consortium from an injured or dead minor child. 3 The court held that
it was "unpersuaded of any legal distinction' between a parent's claim for
consortium and a claim for consortium by a child.'
Despite the fact that the Kentucky Supreme Court could have made
similar arguments in deciding Brooks v. Burkeen65 in 1977, the court
chose to refrain, "because no court or legislature in the United States has
yet seen fit to recognize such an action. We decline the opportunity to be
the first to do so."" However, since 1980 at least fourteen jurisdic-
tions have recognized a child's cause of action for loss of parental
consortium,' with nine of these decisions coming within the last five
691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984).
5 Id. at 192.
I d. at n.3 (relying on WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020). The statute provides, "Every
such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, child or children ... of the
person whose death shall have been so caused." WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.20.020 (1994).
'o Ueland, 691 P.2d at 192.
61 Id.
6z 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981), overruled by Audobon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v.
Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983).
s IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.15 (West 1965).
tWeild, 311 N.W.2d at 265 (quoting Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858,
860 (Cal. 1977)).
6'5 549 S.W.2d 91 (Ky. 1977).
6 Id. at 92.
The fourteen jurisdictions are Alaska, Arizona, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
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years." The Kentucky Supreme Court can no longer stand on its
rationale in Brooks; either the Kentucky Supreme Court or the Kentucky
State Legislature should validate a child's claim for loss of parental
consortium as a cause of action.
I. ARGUMENTS IN JURISDICTIONS REFUSING TO CHANGE
Although the trend is in the opposite direction, a majority of
jurisdictions still refuse to recognize a child's claim for loss of parental
consortium due to a third party's negligence.69 Significantly, the high
and Wyoming. See supra note 3.
- From 1989 to 1994, Wisconsin, Arizona, Oklahoma, Wyoming, West Virginia,
Texas, Montana, Ohio, and New Mexico recognized a child's claim for loss of parental
consortium. See supra note 3.
' See, e.g., Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471, 472-73 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) (holding that a child's claim for loss of parental consortium cannot be upheld);
Meredith v. Scruggs, 244 F.2d 604, 604 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that a claim for loss of
parental consortium must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be
granted); Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 481 (D. Neb. 1980)
(interpreting Nebraska law to conclude that the Nebraska Supreme Court would not
recognize the cause of action); Lewis v. Rowland, 701 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ark. 1985)
(refusing to create a cause of action for loss of parental consortium because such action
should be left to the legislature); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 866
(Cal. 1977) (refusing to create a cause of action for loss of parental consortium); Lee v.
Colorado Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 234 (Colo. 1986) (holding that an action by a
child for loss of parental consortium is not recognized in Colorado); Zorzos v. Rosen, 467
So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1985) (declining to create a new cause of action because such
decisions are best left to the legislature); W.J. Bremer Co. v. Graham, 312 S.E.2d 806,
808 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a child cannot sue for loss of consortium because
there is no statute allowing for such an action); Mueller v. Hellring Construction Co., 437
N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (stating that loss of parental consortium is not
actionable in Illinois); Hickman v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 314 So. 2d 486, 489 (La.
Ct. App. 1975) (holding that children cannot recover for loss of the society and services
of their mother); Monias v. Endal, 623 A.2d 656, 662 (Md. 1993) ("[P]arents and children
do not have a claim for loss of each other's consortium."); Salin v. Kloempken, 322
N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn. 1982) (declining to recognize a cause of action for loss of
parental consortium because of the extra burden it would create on society through
increased insurance costs, added expenses for litigation and settlement, and for public
policy reasons designed to limit liability to a controllable degree); Bradford v. Union
Electric Co., 598 S.W.2d 149, 150-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that, as a matter of
public policy, the decision to create a new cause of action should be left to the
legislature); General Electric Co. v. Bush, 498 P.2d 366, 371 (Nev. 1972) (stating that a
cause of action for loss of parental consortium should be left for the legislature to create);
Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 295 A.2d 862, 863 (N.J. 1972) (preventing minor children
from recovering for loss ofparental consortium); DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Ctr., 445
N.Y.S.2d 188, 195 (1981) (refusing to recognize child's action for loss of parental
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courts of generally progressive states such as California7 and New
Jersey7 still cling to the older doctrine. The basis for refusal in these
jurisdictions is a blend of stare decisis,72 dated policy arguments,73 and
the claim that this is really a legislative issue that would be inappropriate
for the courts to decide.74
One of the most frequently cited cases by courts in these jurisdictions
is the California case of Borer v. American Airlines.75 In Borer, the
mother of nine children was allegedly injured at Kennedy Airport when
a lighting fixture in the American Airlines terminal fell on her head.76
Mrs. Borer claimed that she was no longer able to care for her children
in the same manner as she had before the accident.' Consequently, each
child sought $100,000 in damages for the loss of "services, society,
companionship, affection, tutelage, direction, guidance, instruction and aid
in personality development" of their mother." The Supreme Court of
California summarily rejected the children's claim.79 The court based its
decision upon several policy arguments which permeate the decisions of
courts that also reject such a cause of action."0
The court first noted that allowing such a claim would substantially
increase the number of claims in any given accident, thus making
litigation and settlement more complicated and expensive."' It stated that
consortium for fear of double recovery); Vaughn v. Clarkson, 376 S.E.2d 236, 238 (N.C.
1989) (refusing to recognize child's claim for loss of parental consortium); Morgel v.
Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266, 267 (N.D. 1980) (holding that the creation of a cause of action
for loss of parental consortium should be left to the legislature); Norwest v. Presbyterian
Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318, 333 (Or. 1982) (holding that there is no liability to
children for negligent injury caused to parent); Still by Erlandson v. Baptist Hosp., Inc.,
755 S.W.2d 807, 815 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (declining to recognize a cause of action for
loss of parental consortium).
70 See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc.,'563 P.2d 858, 866 (Cal. 1977) (holding that
a child does not have a nonstatutory cause of action for loss of parental consortium); infra
notes 75-102 and accompanying text.
7' See Russell v. Salem Trans. Co., 295 A.2d 862, 863 (N.J. 1972) (holding that a
minor does not have a cause of action for damages arising out of injuries to parent).
"2 See supra note 45.
See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 75-137 and accompanying text.
'5 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977).
76 Id. at 861.
7 Id.
7 8Id.
7 Id.
,o Id. at 862-65.
' Id. at 860.
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the cost of administration for every accident would increase substantially
because "virtually every serious injury to a parent would engender a
claim for loss of consortium on behalf of each of his or her children."'
The court felt that this would unnecessarily add to the time and expense
of both courts and parties to the litigation. 3
A special consideration to the court appeared to be a sort of sympathy
toward the tortfeasor and an unwillingness to burden him or her with a
large number of claims for a single injury." The court found it bother-
some that the number of claims and the amount of liability would
increase solely because of the number of children an injured parent
happened to have.85 'Magnification of damage awards to a single family
derived from a single accident might well become a serious problem to
a particular defendant." 6 Ultimately the court seemed to be following
a "one injury, one recovery" rule.
A second major argument reasoned that recovery of money damages
can never adequately compensate a child for the loss of an emotional
attachment.' The court stated that any amount of money won in a jury
award or settlement would not make up for the loss of love and affection
no longer provided by an injured parent.8 Essentially, the court implied
that this injury is non-compensable by any means and should not be
allowed. The court concluded that the consequences of such a settle-
ment or award would be to "simply establish a fund so that upon
reaching adulthood, when plaintiffs will be less in need of maternal
guidance, they will be unusually wealthy men and women."
90
The California court also applied a traditional burden/benefit analysis
to justify its decision.91 It noted that the burden on society through
increased insurance premiums and the consequent risk that more people
will choose to go without insurance outweighs the benefit conferred upon
the children,' especially since money is not adequate compensation for
loss of maternal companionship. 3
R2 Id. at 862.
93 Id.
14 Id. at 863.
'
5 Id.
Id. (quoting Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 295 A-2d 862, 864 (N.J. 1972)).
Id. at 860.
"Id. at 862.
89 Id.
9Id.
91 Id.
9Id.
9Id.
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The court also feared the danger of double recovery as a potential
problem which could be created by recognition of this new claim.' In
the Borer case the father of the children could recover for loss of his
wife's consortium, and it appears that the court decided that a jury would
take the children into consideration when deciding how much money to
award the father. 5 Additionally, the mother herself had a legitimate
cause of action as the injured party.96 If the mother had died, then the
children would have been allowed to recover under the state's wrongful
death statute. 7 The court stated, "[T]o ask the jury, even under carefully
drafted instructions, to distinguish the loss to the mother from her
inability to care for her children from the loss to the children from the
mother's inability to care for them may be asking too much."'8
A line must be drawn somewhere to limit potential plaintiffs in a tort
action.9 The court did not want a slippery slope to develop so that
every legally recognized relationship merited compensation when a party
was injured."° The court stated that the line for consortium claims was
best drawn at the marriage relationship.' Opening the door to children
would also open the door to claims from "brothers, sisters, cousins,
inlaws, friends, colleagues, and other acquaintances.""
Further elaborating on the need to keep the line drawn for consortium
claims at the marital relationship, the Supreme Court of Indiana in
Dearborn Fabricating v. Wickham" ruled against recognition of a
child's right to consortium.' In Dearborn, the father of two children
was seriously injured when he fell through a hole in a catwalk."'5 The
court relied on the old "services" idea of consortium and the lack of
sexual relations to distinguish the parent-child relationship from the
husband-wife relationship.' The court went on to state that the crucial
'4 Id. at 863.
See id. (citing Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 295 A.2d 862, 864 (N.J. 1972)).
Id. at 864.
7 Id. at 865. The primary distinction the court saw between a child "whose parent
is killed and one whose parent is disabled ... [is] the fact that in the latter case the living
victim retains his or her own cause of action." Id.
" Id. at 863.
9 Id. at 862.
10 Id. at 860.
... Id. at 862.
102 Id.
13 551 N.E.2d 1135 (Ind. 1990).
4 Id. at 1139.
1 5 Id. at 1136.
106 Id. at 1136-37.
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distinction between a child's and a spouse's claim was that a child could
not choose to "voluntarily" bring the claim."°7 "[A]n adult pursuing a
claim for loss of society and companionship or spousal consortium takes
on the risk of litigation assault upon the familial relationship knowingly
and voluntarily. But this is not so for the child."1 8
Thus, the Indiana court feared that a child would be exposed to some
of the more unpleasant aspects of litigation when the child may not want
to be involved in the first place."0 9 They thought that in order to reduce
the potential amount of damages, defense attorneys would seek to portray
the familial relationships of parent and child as particularly weak."
0
The idea being that the more estranged the children were from their
injured parent before the injury, then the less consortium they were
actually losing."' The pressures from "pretrial investigation, depositions,
trial testimony, and final argument" ' would be too great a burden to
impose on a child who had no choice in entering the litigation.1
"Many loving children heretofore content would thus be likely to suffer
significant emotional harm inflicted by the litigation process itself, in
addition to that already resulting from the parent's injuries."' 14
Similarly, the Pennsylvania high court in Steiner v. Bell Tele-
phone" 5 also relied on what it considered to be significant distinctions
between the parent-child and husband-wife relationships to deny a child's
claim for loss of parental consortium. 6 In Steiner, the mother of two
children had been raped by an intruder while she was in the process of
trying to phone the police.1 7 The operator had put her on hold twice
while she was trying to get the phone number for the police station."'
As a result of the rape, Mrs. Steiner suffered emotional problems and the
Steiner's marriage fell apart."19 The children were suing for injury to
their "family relationship." ' Like the Indiana court, the Pennsylvania
"7 Id. at 1138.
109 Id.
1' Id. at 1137.
110 Id.
"I Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 517 A.2d 1348 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
16 Id. at 1355.
117 Id. at 1349.
119 Id.
119 'd.
120 Ird.
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court held that a spousal relationship was voluntarily entered into by both
parties, while a child had "no control over the commencement of the
parent/child relationship." '' Also of significance to the court was the
fact that a child "perpetually strives to develop from a totally dependent
person to one which is entirely independent."'" Since these relation-
ships are formed differently, the court felt that they were not compara-
ble." Therefore, they dismissed the argument that the objectives of
both relationships, to seek love and companionship, are similar and
should be recognized to support consortium claims. 4
However, the Pennsylvania court based its decision on the argument
that such a claim should be established by the legislature, not the
courts." The court believed that the primary issue in such a claim is
"how far we will extend liability beyond the ordinary principles of
negligence"'26 which is based on the idea of foreseeability" Such
an extension of tort liability inevitably involves a weighing of benefits
and burdens on society as a whole, and thus, must be done very carefully
and based on all available information. The court, therefore, noted that
the state legislature was better able to set up a system of recovery in
these situations which would be just to children with the least amount of
impact on society as a whole."' "It is illusory to believe the public
does not pay for tort recoveries, or that resources for such are limitless.
As it is with everything, a balance must be struck - certain limits
drawn., "i2
9
At least one commentator, questioning the great weight of scholarly
authority and opposing a child's claim for loss of parental consortium, has
placed great weight on the argument that recognizing such a claim will
extend the limits of liability too far.'30 His argument is supported by
Prosser and Keeton, who .also acknowledge that although the purpose of
tort law is to compensate injured parties, "legal responsibility must be
limited to those causes which are so clearly connected with the result and
2 Id. at 1355.
"Id.
12 Id.
12 Id.
'2s Id. at 1356.
1 Id.
17 Id.
128 Id.
'2 Id. at 1357.
130 Edward E. Gainor, The Buck Stop Here: Parents May Not Recover for Loss of
Consortium of a Negligently Injured Child, 5 COOLEY L. REv. 811, 833 (1988).
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of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability."13'
This argument compares the nature of other secondary claims - claims
where someone other than the physically injured party is making the
claim - to the child's claim for loss of consortium.
The author argues that loss of consortium and emotional distress are
the primary examples of secondary claims in our tort system.3 2 These
actions are strictly limited for two reasons. First, every injury to a person
results in secondary injuries to relatives, friends, or people who rely on
the injured party."3 Next, the injured party has his or her own right to
make a claim for the injury." Therefore, the benefit to be conferred,
when recognizing a new secondary claim, must greatly outweigh the costs
to society."5 As a result, the focus shifts from looking at the plaintiff's
point of view to the burden imposed upon society by increased insurance
premiums and extended litigation." 6 Consequently, courts recognizing
a child's right to sue for loss of parental consortium need to define a new
point at which liability will end. Otherwise, "what distinguishes the
parental consortium claim from other non-marital consortium claims that
have been rejected?""' 7
IV. TaE TREND TOWARD RECOGNITION
Currently, at least fourteen jurisdictions have been able to counter the
arguments set out above and recognize that a child has a cause of action
for loss of parental consortium due to another's negligence." In fact,
over the last five years, nine jurisdictions have ruled in favor of such a
claim, while only two courts have continued to follow stare decisis and
increasingly unjustifiable policy reasons to disallow such a claim.'"
Three of these decisions are of special note, as they collectively address
and refute all of the substantial arguments against recognition of a child's
right to consortium.
In 1984, with its decision in Ueland v. Reynolds Metals,14 the
Supreme Court of Washington became the fifth jurisdiction to recognize
..' KEErON ET AL., supra note 33, § 41, at 264.
'32 Gainor, supra note 130, at 830.
13 Id.
"'id.
m Id.
'36 Id. at 831.
" Id. at 832.
L3 See supra note 3.
'31 See supra notes 68, 103, 115.
'40 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984).
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a child's claim for loss of parental consortium.' 4' Ueland involved a suit
by the two minor children of a man injured in the course of his employ-
ment.Y2 Since the husband and wife were separated, the wife chose not
to bring a consortium action herself, but instead let the children make the
claim. 4' The trial court ruled in favor of allowing the children to bring
such a claim.' 4 The Washington Supreme Court bypassed the court of
appeals and took immediate review of the case. 4 ' In their decision, the
court addressed several of the major policy issues set forth in the
California court's Borer decision.146
First, the court rejected the notion that such a claim should be
established by the legislature holding that since they had created the right
to consortium for the wife of a negligently injured husband, there was no
good reason why they could not exercise that right to create such a claim
for a child of a negligently injured parent.147 The court stated that it is
the duty of the courts to update the common law when necessary and not
to resist the need to expand it.'4'
Next, the court addressed the contention that allowing the cause of
action would result in multiple lawsuits. 49 It followed the suggestion
of the Iowa Supreme Court in Weid v. Moes"0 to require that the
child's claim be joined with the parent's own personal injuiy claim
whenever possible."' This would alleviate any need for multiple
proceedings and any fear of increased administrative costs. The court also
considered the plaintiffs' right to have their claims judged on the merits,
and said that courts should not engage "in gloomy speculation as to
where it will all end."'5
Third, the court refuted the claim that damages would be too
speculative and difficult to measure.' Since assessing damages in a
parental consortium claim would be no more difficult than determining
141 Id.
142 Id. at 191.
143 Id.
144 Id.
14S Id.
'4 See supra notes 75-102 and accompanying text.
47 Ueland, 691 P.2d at 193.
'4 Id.
'",Id.
"50 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981); see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
". Ueland, 691 P.2d at 194.
15. Id. at 193 (quoting from Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Mich. 1981)).
153 Id. at 194.
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damages in the already sanctioned claim of spousal consortium, the court
felt that this argument only deserved minimal attention.1'
Next, the Washington Supreme Court addressed the idea that a
monetary award would not adequately compensate the suffering children
for their injury.'55 The court noted that this was true but felt that "it is
the only workable way that our legal system has found to ease the injured
party's tragic loss."'56 Furthermore, the award could help ensure the
child of normal development until adulthood by covering expenses for
medical and psychiatric treatment." Although the money would not
completely compensate the child for his or her loss, it could certainly
"lessen the impact of the loss. '' 5
According to the Washington court, the fear of double recovery could
be overcome by proper jury instructions."'59 The court did not agree that
all juries consider the children when fixing damages for a personal injury
award."6 At least, there was no guarantee. The court held: "The proper
approach is to bring out in the open the children's damages and properly
instruct the jury that they are separate and distinct from the parent's
injury.' '6'
Additionally, the Ueland court noted that it was not proper to limit
the possibility of recovery to minor children." The court decided that
the jury should consider the age of the children in their award, as such
a decision was consistent with the right of adult children to recover under
the Washington court's prior wrongful death decisions."
Finally, the court dismissed the argument that acknowledgment of
such a claim would put too much of a burden on society through
increased insurance rates." "When considering the recognition of a
new cause of action, the specter of increased insurance rates is one of our
least concerns."'65 Ultimately, the court stated that the benefits con-
ferred on society by the normal development of the child would far
T
5 Id.
155 Id.
1
" Id. (quoting Theama v. Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 520 (Wis. 1984)).
15 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 194-95.
16O Id.
, Id.
", Id. at 195.
" Id.
164 Id.
16 Id.
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outweigh the burden on society as a result of increased insurance
costs.166
In agreement with the Washington court, the Supreme Court of Ohio
in Gallimore v. Children's Hospital" declined to follow stare decisis.
In one fell swoop the court reversed precedent from a year earlier and
recognized both a parent's right to loss of a child's consortium, and a
child's right to loss of parental consortium.'68 The lack of regard for
precedent was justified by the court as overruling "an unfair and legally
unjustifiable conclusion.' 69
In recognizing a child's claim for loss of consortium, the Ohio court
refuted the traditional arguments against allowing such a claim. They also
reflected on arguments made by previous courts in support of the claim.
Of primary importance to the court was the fact that Ohio's Wrongful
Death Act 7 permitted "claimants to recover for loss of earning capaci-
ty, services and society of the decedent.'' To deny recovery when a
parent was injured but allow it when the parent died, presented an unfair
situation to the court."
When it came to the issue of drawing a line on liability so that the
class of foreseeable plaintiffs would not stretch on infinitely, the court
drew the line at the parent-child relationship.' This would prohibit
collateral relatives, distant ancestors, and further descendants from
recovering. Integral to this conclusion was the idea that "[t]he parent-
child relationship is unique, and it is particularly deserving of special
recognition in the law."'74 Furthermore, the court felt that recovery
should be limited to minor children only.17
The Ohio court justified its right to create such an action without
legislative sanction on the same basis as the court in Ueland176 Since
the wife's right to loss of consortium for her spouse's injury had been
16 Id.
167 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio 1993).
6 Id. at 1060. The Ohio Supreme Court expressly rejected a child's claim for loss of
parental consortium in High v. Howard, 592 N.E.2d 818, 820 (Ohio 1992). A change in
the makeup of the court was the ultimate reason for the complete reversal. See Gallimore,
617 N.E.2d at 1062-67 (Wright, J., dissenting).
Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1060.
170 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Anderson 1990).
1 Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1057.
n Id.
"' Id. at 1058.
174 d.
1 Id. at 1060.
'76 Id. at 1059; see supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
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court-created in Ohio, the court found nothing wrong with recognizing a
similar right for a child. The court stated: "The common law is not static.
It is dynamic, and it must continue to evolve to keep up with the
times."1" As a result, the court overruled its earlier decision and joined
the growing number of jurisdictions recognizing a child's right to loss of
consortium for a negligently injured parent.
Perhaps the most thorough opinion in this area of the law is the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Theama v. Kenosha.' In
this case the father of two minor children was seriously injured in a
motorcycle accident due to a deep pothole in the street.79 In a unani-
mous decision, the court upheld the claim by two minor children for loss
of their father's consortium.'
In reaching its decision the court noted a significant distinction
between the parent-child and husband-wife relationships which suggested
that the parent-child relationship was the most deserving of compensa-
tion."' The court considered an adult more capable than a child in
forming new relationships "to fill in the void of his or her loss."'"
Consequently, the monetary compensation received by a child "may be
the child's only method of reducing his or her deprivation of the parent's
society and companionship." '
Additionally, the court pointed out that the legal rights of children in
the United States have been constantly evolving away from the master-
servant common law model.' Various decisions by the U.S. Supreme
Court have recognized that children are persons under the Constitution,
that they have First Amendment rights, and have the protection of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."
'77 Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1059.
'7 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984).
'7 Id. at 513.
" Id. at 522. The majority of decisions in favor of this new cause of action are often
followed by multiple dissenting opinions. The fact that the Wisconsin court has been able
to agree on the question of a child's claim for loss of parental consortium suggests that
it is possible to extend the consortium claim to children without exceeding the reasonable
and foreseeable limits of liability for a particular claim.
... Id. at 516.
182 Id.
1"3 Id.
11 Id. at 517.
185Id. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (stating that "the State is
constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a
property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be
taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that
Clause"); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that a twelve year-old child
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The court felt that these legal developments, as well as the importance of the
family unit to society, demanded that the court recognize "the gravity of harm
suffered by a child who is deprived of his or her parent's society and
companionship due to another's negligence."'86
The Wisconsin court also believed that drawing a new line for recovery
at the parent-child relationship would clearly prevent claims from relatives
who are further removed. The court, quoting one scholar, stated:
The distinction between the interests of children and those of other relatives
is rational and easily applied. Most children are dependent on their parents
for emotional sustenance. This is rarely the case with more remote relatives.
Thus, by limiting the plaintiffs in the consortium action to the victim's
children, the courts would ensure that the losses compensated would be both
real and severe."8 7
The court also reasoned that the emotional importance of the parent-child
relationship would always outweigh any attendant burdens on society through
increased insurance premiums because it would give the child a better chance
of growing up normally.' "The family relationship 'is the relationship on
which all society must depend for endurance, permanence, and well-
being."' 189 Thus, the Wisconsin court provided a sound argument for
limiting claims for loss of consortium to immediate family members, thereby
preventing the slide of consortium claims down the detractors' slippery slope.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN KENTUCKY
It is within the Kentucky Supreme Court's prerogative to recognize
a child's right to make a claim for loss of parental consortium. Consor-
is entitled to the same constitutional protections and burden of proof as an adult for
violations of criminal law); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(holding that students have a constitutional right to free speech in all school areas, not just
in the classroom); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1967) (stating that "neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone"); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that because of segregation children have
unequal educational opportunities and are thus deprived of equal protection of the laws,
which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
186 Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 518.
Id. at 521 (quoting David P. Dwork, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of a
Parent's Love, Care and Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.
L. REv. 722, 738 (1976)).
188 Id.
189 Id. (quoting Dwork, supra note 187, at 741).
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tium is a basic common law cause of action, and the state's high court is
responsible for bringing Kentucky in line with developments in the
common law. The right to make a claim for loss of consortium by wives,
although it is presently established by statute, was first recognized by the
judiciary in the Kotsiris decision.' The Kentucky courts can also no
longer deny this claim due to lack of precedent. 9' There are at least
fourteen jurisdictions that have judicially recognized a child's right to
compensation for loss of parental consortium and the number is likely to
rise."n The Kentucky Supreme Court, when making a major shift in the
state's common law by adopting pure comparative negligence, stated in
Hilen v. Hays: "The common law is not a stagnant pool, but a moving
stream .... We are responsible for its directions."'93
While it is true that Kentucky does not recognize secondary claims
(e.g., bystander recovery) for negligent infliction of emotional distress
without some sort of physical contact," the court has been very
generous in its application of what appears to be a rather strict rule.'95
In Wilson v. Redken Laboratories, Inc.,"6 the Supreme Court of
Kentucky upheld a $30,000 jury verdict for purely cosmetic damage to
the plaintiff's hair.'97 There was no injury causing physical pain to the
plaintiff herself In Murray v. Lawson,9' the plaintiff's alleged "phobic
'9'See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
'9The Supreme Court's expressed reason for denying the claim in Brooks was that
no other jurisdiction had yet recognized it. Brooks v. Burkeen, 549 S.W.2d 91, 91 (Ky.
1977).
1-2 KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, § 125, at 936. "[1]t must now be recognized that
the more liberal view may well gain further adherents." Id.
'9 673 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Ky. 1984) (emphasis added).
The court of appeals refused to allow bystander recovery without physical contact
in Wilhoite v. Cobb, 761 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988). In that case a mother saw
a negligent truck driver run over and kill her child, but she was not allowed to recover
damages for emotional distress because she had not suffered any physical injury or
contact with the truck. Id. The court noted that the distinction between the x-rays that
caused a recoverable injury in Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980), and the
light rays which caused the mother her distress in this case "is that the thing which causes
the injury to a victim must also come in contact with the witness for that witness to
recover for mental distress." Id.
' "It is well established in this jurisdiction that 'an action will not lie for fright,
shock or mental anguish which is unaccompanied by physical contact or injury."'
Deutsch, 597 S.W.2d at 145-46 (citing Morgan v. Hightower's Adm'r, 163 S.W.2d 21, 22
(Ky. 1942)).
m 562 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1978).
'9Id. at 636.
m 441 S.W.2d 136 (Ky. 1969).
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reaction!' to an injury from which she had completely recovered was held
relevant to prove damages.'99 In the greatest stretch of all, the court in
Deutsch v. Shein20' held that x-rays to a plaintiff's abdomen satisfied
the physical contact requirement."' The plaintiff was pregnant and
feared that the x-rays would damage her unborn chile 2 In upholding
the plaintiff's claim for mental suffering, the court stated: "We find no
difficulty in concluding that the physical contact necessary to support the
claim for mental suffering occurred when... Mrs. Deutsch's person was
bombarded by x-rays."'
The preceding cases demonstrate the court's willingness to loosely
interpret its rules regarding recovery for mental suffering due to another's
negligence and, thereby, increase the pool of foreseeable plaintiffs. If x-
rays can be said to make enough physical contact to satisfy a crucial
requirement for recovery under negligent infliction of emotional distress,
surely it would not be incongruent for the court to thus extend loss of
consortium recovery to children of injured parents. This author posits that
often the injury to the child will be easily discemable and the court will
not have to push the definition of "physical contact" to extremes in order
to justify compensation, as it did in Deutsch. In fact, the court should
have a clear guideline based on the family relationships of parent/child
and husband/wife.
The state's statutory law regarding juveniles further reflects the
appropriateness of drawing the line at the immediate family relationships.
For example, the introductory section of the Kentucky Unified Juvenile
Code reads: "The Commonwealth shall direct its efforts to the strengthen-
ing and encouragement of family life for the protection and care of
children,"2 '" and "[ilt also shall be declared to be the policy of this
Commonwealth that all efforts shall be directed toward providing each
child a safe and nurturing home."2 "5 Thus, the Kentucky legislature
appears to recognize the value of children to families and to the state as
a whole. Although it is unclear why the legislature has not specifically
authorized a child's loss of consortium claim for an injured parent, it does
seem that the General Assembly appreciates the value of the parent-child
relationship.
1-9 Id. at 138.
597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980).
2" Id. at 146.
m" Id. at 142-43.
2m Id. at 146.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.010(2)(a) (Baldwin 1995).
-5 Id. § 600.010(2)(b).
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Another consideration that has not been adequately addressed by the
courts, but has been noted by one commentator in Kentucky, is the rise
of single-parent families across the United States."6 In these families,
if the mother or father is seriously injured, the children will have no other
parent to rely upon. It hardly seems fair to deprive the child of any
possible remedy for this situation. At the very least a monetary settlement
would provide the opportunity for the child to obtain counseling as well
as equipping him or her with the usual accouterments of youth.20 7 The
money could also be put in Mst for their use upon reaching majority.0 '
For example, a child could be assured of college tuition and thereby
potentially increase his value to society as a whole. Yet, as the law now
stands, such a child could only acquire monetary compensation for loss
of his or her parent in an action for wrongful death. If the parent remains
alive, but injured, the child may realize no recovery for the loss of
guidance, companionship, and affection.
CONCLUSION
In Brooks v. Burkeen,0 9  Kentucky's Supreme Court indirectly
considered a child's right to sue for loss of consortium when a parent is
injured by another's negligence. With the trend in so many jurisdictions
toward recognizing this cause of action, however, the foundation for the
court's holding in Brooks is now questionable. It would seem that a
reexamination of this issue would now lead to recognition of such a cause
of action.
The courts in Kentucky have the authority to create this cause of
action. It has been judicially created in fourteen other jurisdictions, and
it is a natural result of the common law development of consortium
claims. Moreover, Kentucky's Supreme Court was among the minority of
jurisdictions in 1970 when it recognized a wife's cause of action for loss
of her husband's consortium 210 as well as when it made pure compara-
tive negligence the law of the Commonwealth in 1984.211 Now, the
1 See Ralph S. Petrilli, A Child's Right to Collect for Parental Consortium Where
Parent is Seriously Injured, 26 J. FAM. L. 317, 344-45 (1987-88) (discussing the
implications of a 71.7% increase in the United States from 1970 to 1980 of families
headed by women).
207 Id. at 346.
2N Id.
549 S.W.2d 91 (Ky. 1977).
21 See Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970).
2 1 See Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
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Kentucky Supreme Court must accept its ability to change what has
become an unjustifiable and dated concept regarding Kentucky's common
law of loss of consortium.
It is highly incongruent to allow a spouse to recover for loss of love
and companionship, for parents to recover for loss of their children's
affection, and for children to recover when a parent dies, but to deny a
consortium claim for a child who is deprived of a parent's love and
companionship due to another's negligence. The claim is a natural
extension of established statutory law in the Commonwealth and the
growing trend in the common law. Kentucky can no longer hide behind
outdated policy and irrational justification. It must recognize and embrace
the new day in loss of consortium claims, and it must allow children to
recover for the loss of parental consortium.
Bruce Gehle
